The King's Cross Underground station fire.

On 18 November 1987, at approximately 19:30, a fire broke out at King's Cross St. Pancas tube station, a major interchange on the London Underground. As well as the mainline railway stations above ground and subsurface platforms for the Metropolitan lines, there were platforms deeper underground for the Northern, Piccadilly and Victoria lines. The fire had started on a wooden escalator serving the Piccadilly line and, at 19:45, erupted in a flashover into the underground ticket hall, killing 31 people and injuring 100.

At King's Cross, as well as the mainline railway station above ground and subsurface platforms for the Metropolitan line, there are platforms deeper underground for the Northern, Piccadilly, and Victoria lines. There were two separate escalator shafts leading down to the Victoria and Piccadilly lines.

At about 19:30 several passengers reported seeing a fire on a Piccadilly line escalator. Staff and police went to investigate and on confirming the fire one of the policemen went to the surface to radio for the fire brigade. Four fire engines and a turntable ladder were sent by the fire brigade control room at 19:36. The fire was beneath the escalator was  impossible to get close enough to use a fire extinguisher. There was water fog equipment but underground staff had not been trained in its use. The decision to evacuate the station was made at 19:39, using the Victoria line escalators. A few minutes later the fire brigade arrived and several firefighters went down to the escalator to assess the fire. They saw a fire about the size of a large cardboard box and planned to fight it with a water jet using firefighters wearing breathing apparatus sets.

At 19:42 the entire escalator was aflame, producing superheated gas that rose to the top of the shaft enclosing the escalator, where it was trapped against the tunnel’s ceiling, which was covered with about twenty layers of old paint. As the superheated gases pooled along the ceiling of the escalator shaft, all those old layers of paint began absorbing the warmth. The ceilings had been repainted several times in the past without removing the old paint. (A few years before the fire, the Underground's director of operations had suggested that all this paint might pose a fire hazard. However painting protocols were not in his purview and his suggestion was widely ignored by his colleagues.)

Three minutes later a flashover occurred. A jet of flames came up from the escalator shaft filling the ticket hall with intense heat and thick black smoke. It killed killing or seriously injuring most of the people in the ticket hall. The fire trapped several hundred people below ground, who escaped on Victoria line trains. Several policemen with an injured man attempted to leave via a platform, but found their way blocked by locked gates. These were later unlocked by a station cleaner. Staff and a policewoman trapped on a Metropolitan line platform were rescued by a passing train.

Thirty fire crews, over 150 firefighters, were deployed. Fourteen London Ambulance Service ambulances ferried the injured to local hospitals, including University College Hospital.

Thirty-one people died and 100 people were taken to hospital, 19 with serious injuries.  London Fire Brigade Station Officer Colin Townsley was in charge of the first fire engine to arrice at the scene and was down in the ticket hall at the time of the flashover. He did not survive, his body was found beside that of a badly burnt woman passenger at the base of the exit steps to Pancas Road. It was believed that Colin Townsley spotted the passengher in difficulty and stopped to assist her to safety. Neither of them reached it.

The funeral of the late Colin Townsley. GM.

 

Assistant Divisional Officer Cliff Shore was the station commander at Euston fire station. He was first senior officer to arrive at the Kings Cross fire. He was later awarded the MBE for his work that night. The following are his own words:

"From the time that I received the call I had an uneasy feeling about the incident that was to follow. This feeling was compounded by the presence of smoke some three quarters of a mile from Kings Cross and the heavy traffic build up. I was forced to park in York Way and was unable to see the blue flashing lights of the appliances due to the density of smoke.

When I got to the scene I was confronted with two persons in a collapsed condition. I immediately got two firemen to render first aid. On initial reconnaissance dense smoke was coming from three entrances in Euston and Pancras Roads, and the concourse of the main line station was rapidly filling with smoke. I was unable to make contact with any officer and quickly realised that a serious and chaotic situation was in progress.

I assumed control and made Pumps 8, Ambulances 4, Persons Reported. I was desperately short of officers and men to carry out all the tasks that were needed. I was informed that two members of the public had been found inside and that four members of the Brigade were missing. The heat coming from the entrances was extremely intense.

It was obvious that there could be large numbers of people involved, therefore in my planned rescue attempts and attack on the fire from three different entrances, I was forced to put firefighters through punishing conditions. It was therefore conductive to have experienced BA crews with a minimum of a junior officer in charge and probationary firemen not to be included as part of the crew.

A short time after I took command I was present when Station Officer Townsley was brought out and with a negative response from the ambulance resuscitator, and with three other members of the Brigade still missing, I feared the worst. When I was relieved of command I was able to get below and immediately the true horror of it all started to unfold when I came across eight bodies. I was most relieved to reach two of the missing members of the Brigade, who had been cut off since the flashover, both of whom were uninjured. I returned to the main area of fire, and satisfied that it was now under control, returned to the Control Unit and reported this to the Officer in Charge.

I would like to commend the work, dedication and heroism of all the members of the Brigade at this incident, which I feel was attributable to many more lives being saved, and I feel most proud to have served with those involved".

The fire was declared out at 01:46 the following morning.

At the time of the Kings Cross fire, the fire kit worn by London’s firefighters consisted of thin yellow over-trousers, a woollen tunic and cork helmet, which left much of a firefighter's neck and ears exposed, even when wearing breathing apparatus. Their PVC protective gloves would have been more at home in the garden. Improvements were made to personal protective equipment for firefighters - the combed-helmet was replaced by Kevlar headgear, and some fire and rescue services have opted for a design that encloses the ears. Padded over-trousers and more substantial tunics, with collars, were also introduced. 

Many heroic acts took place that horrific night. Not all were recorded and placed in the public domain. The London Fire Brigade convened a special Honours and Awards Board to consider the actions of its firefighters that fateful fire. It concluded that Station Officer Colin James TOWNSLEY, attached to Soho fire station, be posthumously awarded the Chief Officer's Commendation following the Kings Cross Underground fire. He was the Officer in Charge of the initial attendance, riding Soho's Pump Ladder. He and his pump ladder crew had made their way to the station concourse, at the head of the escalators, where activity at the station appeared normal; although a small fire was apparent about one third of the way down of the right hand escalator. Ordering his crews to rig in BA and get a jet to work, he sent a priority message, 'persons reported'. The resultant, and unexpected, flashover tragically leaves questions as to what exactly happens next as to firefighting operations, but his own escape was delayed to  assist a badly burned young woman along the St Pancras subway. As a fit and strong man he would have certainly reached safety but for his courageous and selfless act of helping another. For heroism, supreme humanity and outstanding leadership he was subsequently posthumously awarded the GEORGE MEDAL.

Assistant Chief Officer Joe Kennedy (North East Area HQ): Assistant Divisional Officer Clifford John Shore (North Area HQ): Sub Officer Vernon Ronald Trefry, Firemen Paul Henry Hale and Robert Edward Moulton- all attached to Soho fire station, were awarded a Chief Officer's Commendation; the highest London Fire Brigade honour.

Assistant Divisional Officer Clifford Shore was subsequently awarded the MBE (Gallantry); Sub Officer Trefry and Firemen Hale and Moulton were each awarded the Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct.

The Chief Officer's Letter of Congratulations were also awarded to; Station Officer Peter Kenneth Osborne of Manchester Square fire station: T/Sub Officer Roger William Bell, T/ Leading Fireman  David Charles Flanagan and Firemen Joseph James Boland, Manjit Singh of Clerkenwell fire station: Firemen Stewart Button, John Edgar, David Charles Priestman, David Robert Smith and Steve John Bell  all attached to Soho fire station: Station Officer Alan Pryke of North Area Staff and T/Station Officer Roger De Monte North East Area Staff.

Firemen Button and Edgar were subsequently both awarded the Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct.

A public inquiry into the incident was subsequently conducted by Desmond Fennell, OBE, QC., assisted by a panel of four expert advisers. The inquiry opened at Westminster's Central Hall, on 1 February 1988 and closed on 24 June, after hearing 91 days of evidence.

Smoking on Underground trains was banned in July 1984. Following a serious fire at the Oxford Circus underground station in November 1984, the ban was extended to all underground stations in February 1985. However, smokers often ignored this and lit cigarettes on the escalators on their way out. The inquiry found the fire was most probably caused by a traveller discarding a burning match that fell down the side of the moving staircase on to the running track of the escalator.

London Underground were strongly criticised in the report for their attitude to fires underground, underestimating the hazard because no one had died in a fire underground before. Staff were expected to send for the Fire Brigade only if the fire was out of control, dealing with it themselves if possible. Fires were called smouldering and staff had little or no training to deal with fires or evacuation.

In a House of Common debate into the Fennell report findings and its recommendations Frank Dobson, the then MP for Holborn and St Pancras, made the following comments to the Secretary of State for Transport; Michael Portillo. 

“The inquiry, although absolutely necessary, was in itself an additional cruelty for many who had to give evidence. It forced them to relive the horrors of that night, and also subjected their every action throughout the crisis, minute by minute, to the harshest, most clinical public scrutiny. Something to which few of us would like to be subjected even for an afternoon at the House of Commons, where nothing more than our reputation is at stake.

I found it a humbling experience to read how my ordinary fellow citizens reacted when faced with a fearful combination of fire, fumes, smoke, darkness, noise and panic, all of it below ground. In that heat and horror many ordinary people performed extraordinary deeds, saying afterwards that they were only doing their jobs. No words of praise or admiration from me, at least, can do justice to, for example the fire fighter Station Officer Colin Townsley.

When Colin Townsley arrives on the scene he goes down to the booking hall, reconnoitres down the escalators and instructs other members of his watch to go back to the surface to order more pumps and bring breathing apparatus for themselves and for him. He himself stays down there, in that dangerous, horrible place, to urge passengers to get out. The flashover fire occurs. The booking hall is engulfed in flames. Flames so hot that they melt aluminium. Colin Townsley gropes around in the dark, and picks up a woman who is badly injured and burned. He makes for an exit where light and air would represent life to both of them, but the fumes poison him before he reaches safety. The report says, in its prosaic way: his was a heroic act.  St. John's Gospel says: Greater love hath no man than this that a man lay down his life for his friends. Colin Townsley laid down his life for a stranger.

Constable Hanson of the Transport police, although himself very badly burned and injured, risked his life to save more people, more strangers. We should remember that to the members of the emergency services the risk of injury and death is an ever-present part of their workaday world. When a catastrophe occurs, the rest of us run away, but the people in the emergency services run towards it.

The Fennell report rightly makes it clear that the fire and the shortcomings in the response to it were not the fault of the people working at King's Cross that night, nor were they the fault of those working in the emergency services that night. But the fire should not have occurred and, having occurred, it should have been dealt with more promptly and more effectively. The responsibility for any failure lies with the managements of London Regional Transport and the emergency services, with those who laid down the priorities to be followed by those managements and with those in Government whose job was and remains to secure the safe operation of all our railways. At the pinnacle of that pyramid of responsibility is the Secretary of State for Transport."

The London Fire Brigade honours the memory of the King's Cross Victims.

Footnotes on the Kings Cross fire.

For 16 years, he was 'body 115'. Then in 2003 the mystery victim of the King's Cross fire was finally identified as Alexander Fallon. The small, unnamed grave in a corner of a north London cemetery had held on to one of the last secrets of the King's Cross fire. But the mystery of body 115 (named after its mortuary tag number) – was solved. Forensic experts from the British transport police confirmed that the remains belong to 72-year-old Alexander Fallon, a homeless Scot. No one knows what the pensioner was doing at King's Cross station just after 7.30pm on November 18 1987, when a fireball swept up the wooden escalator and into the ticket hall, killing 31 people.

According to his family, Fallon's life had begun to unravel 13 years earlier when his wife died from ovarian cancer. He sold their house in Falkirk, and in the early 1980s headed south to London where he began sleeping rough. He kept in touch with his four daughters, two of whom were in Scotland and two in the US, with the odd letter and phone call until 1987 - then nothing. But Fallon was just one of thousands of "missing people" in London, and officers trying to identify the badly burned remains had little to go on. When the body of "115" was recovered from the wreckage of the station, detectives trying to establish the identity had little to go on. They knew they were looking for the family of a man who was 5ft 2in tall, a heavy smoker and had recently had brain surgery. But they believed the victim was in his 50s or early 60s - 10 years younger than Fallon. 

Sadly, tragedy visited the same underground station again in the terrorist attack on London on July 7, 2005. A bomb exploded on a train in the tunnel between King's Cross and Russell Square. The London Fire Brigade rescued victims trapped below.

When, following the London Tube bombings of July 7 2005, it was revealed that radios used by most blue-light emergency services still did not work underground, despite recommendations made 20 years earlier in his report into the King’s Cross fire, Fennell drily observed: “If the Americans can communicate with a man on the moon, then it seems extraordinary that the Brits cannot get a system going down to people 20 yards beneath the surface.”