The Smithfield Meat Market Fire: January 1958.

Introduction.

In the early hours of the morning on Thursday 23^rd January 1958, firemen arrived at the Smithfield Meat Market. By the time the blaze was finally contained, days later, two members of the London Fire Brigade were dead and a further twenty-six were hospitalised.

On arrival, the fire was discovered to be deep within the basement labyrinth. The crews from Clerkenwell fire station were among the first on site. Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells (47) and Fireman Richard Daniel Stocking (31) would later head down into the dense smoke that filled the extensive basement. Tragically, they never returned to the surface alive.

After 25 hours, and around 3am on the Friday morning flames engulfed the ground floor of the Market. The intense heat and flammable gasses from the basement escaped and fire quickly consumed the entire Poultry Market. As the flames reached over 100 feet, it was decided that the fire was too fierce to extinguish and the brigade began focusing their efforts on protecting the surrounding buildings.

The ‘stop’ message was received at 16:45 on Friday 24th January. Over 700 oxygen cylinders had been used, worn by some 400 firemen in breathing apparatus in the three days of firefighting operations. A total attendance of more than 1700 officers and firemen, with 389 pumps and other appliances attended from 56 of the LCC’s 58 fire stations as well as some from surrounding fire brigades. The final brigade appliance withdrew from the scene on the 7^th February.

Smithfield.

The original Poultry Market was designed by Sir Horace Jones. The London Central (Smithfield) Markets, of which the poultry market was part, consisted of four buildings of almost equal size. They covered an area of around ten acres. Each one some 250 ft by 240 ft. Of particular note were the basements to these buildings which were slightly larger due to them running under the adjacent pavements. The building where the fire originated started was known as The Poultry Market. 

At the time of the fire it was estimated that around 800 tons of poultry, game and meat was stored at the market. The single story buildings were constructed of load bearing brick walls with ornamental towers around 70ft high at the corners and centres of buildings. It had a pitched slate on boarding roof, wired louvers topped the structure. The roof was supported on cast iron columns and beams. None of these beams were protected against fire.

The basement was constructed with a concrete floor. The ground floor which was about 2ft. thick was formed from brick arches, and covered with 8 inch thick stone slabs. Inside the building the galleries and ground floor were partitioned to form offices and shops. The partitions were built from timber, lath and plaster on timber studwork, breeze blocks rendered with plaster. The basement had been divided into around 90 storage compartments. Many had been divided further into sub-compartments. Whilst some compartments were accessible via doors from basement corridors, others could only be accessed by entering through trapdoors in the ground floor of the market. Access in the basement was further reduced by a railway tunnel which ran diagonally through it. This tunnel was bridged at 2 points using stepped crossovers, but these crossovers had limited headroom.

Some access to the basement was available by electric lifts within the building and trapdoors which were set in the pavement outside. Further entry to the basement could be made via tunnels that were used to pass refrigerated air use to cool the basement. These tunnels contained heavy insulated doors that formed air locks to help prevent the escape of cold air. One large section of the basement was insulated with slab cork covered with cement, elsewhere the basement was insulated with granulated cork, slab cork or slag wool held in place with timber studwork or match boarding. A large amount of bituminous sheeting was used in conjunction with the insulation.

One fireman’s story.

Fireman John Bishop started his career in the London Fire Brigade at the age of 20 in February 1949. He had already served six years at sea in the Merchant service joining at just 14 years of age! This red haired young fireman started his days at Clerkenwell, the Divisional headquarters of the former LCC B Division which cover the City of London and the East End. It was one of four Divisional stations which covered the London Fire Brigade’s 58 stations. It was here he learned his craft alongside war-time firemen and those returned from active duty in WWII serving with the armed forces.

John, or ‘Ginger’ as he was known would learn his craft the hard way; especially when he ended up in hospital for several days after attending a refuse lorry fire in a council yard. By 1954 he was promoted to Leading Fireman rank and still at Clerkenwell. Then on the 11^th May 1954 Clerkenwell’s pump-escape and pump were called to a fire at Langley Street, off Covent Garden. It was fate that saved John from possible death and certain serious injury. The crews had been called to a five storey warehouse, approximately 45 ft. x 100 ft. packed with crates and market materials. The building had recently been fumigated with a paraffin-based chemical. Whilst two firemen stayed outside to operate the pump seven others, led by Station Officer Frederick Hawkins, went inside to deal with the small fire. Leading Fireman Bishop was detailed to walk around the back of the warehouse as the others entered and climbed the stairs. Suddenly the fumes inside exploded. The resultant shock waves brought the roof down. The shingled roof covering was still reinforced with cobble stones which had been placed on top during the war as protection against incendiary bombs. The whole lot came crashing down burying all those on the stairs. The dead and injured were entombed in tons of debris. Whilst assistance was summoned John and his two colleagues fought desperately to reach their fallen colleagues.

(Station Officer Frederick Hawkins and fireman A E J Batt-Rawden died at the scene. Five other firefighters were seriously injured. Sub Officer Sidney Peen, Leading Fireman Ernest Datlin and firemen Kenneth Aylward, Frederick Parr, Richard Daniel Stocking and Charles Gadd were all removed to hospital. Charles Gadd died from injuries, three of the injured required plastic surgery treatment. John Bishop escaped with bruises.)

By January 1958 John Bishop had been promoted to Sub Officer rank. On the 23 January he was the acting Station Officer in charge of the Red Watch at Whitefriars fire station and whose ground adjoined the Smithfield Meat Market complex. 

The first call to the Brigade was received at 02.18 a.m. It was to a fire at ‘The Union Cold Storage’ premises in Smithfield Street. The Lambeth control room, located in the basement of the Brigade Headquarters, mobilised Clerkenwell’s pump-escape, pump and emergency tender, Whitefriars pump plus Cannon Street’s turntable ladder. It was evident on arrival that there was fire within the basement, the problem was finding it.

Bishop’s crew was the first to arrive at the Smithfield Meat Market fire. He, together with another fireman, were preparing to investigate the thick smoke coming up from the markets basement when Station Officer Jack Fort-Wells from Clerkenwell arrived. As it was Fourt-Wells’s ground, and he was the substantive Station Officer, he immediately took charge. His first objective was to find the extent and seat of the fire. He was aided in his task by having not only firemen using breathing apparatus carried on the two pumps but the special breathing apparatus crew riding his station’s emergency tender. Fourt-Wells not only had difficulty in assessing the extent of the fire but how to gain effective access to it. Eight minutes after his arrival, and with no swift resolve in locating the fire, Fourt-Wells sent the first assistance message making pumps four.

Station Officer Fourt-Wells had been taken by an employee to the plant, room tunnel, where he encountered thick smoke. Returning to the surface Fourt-Wells, rigged in breathing apparatus and was joined by his emergency tender crew. The BA team entered the tunnel to locate the source of the smoke. The plant, room tunnel was searched but no fire was found. Information was received that the fire could be in the main basement that was secured with a padlock. Eventually the crew found the door and were provided with a key. By this time the crew were running low on oxygen. (Of the 5 crew members, one gauge read 10 atmospheres one gauge read 5 atmospheres and the other gauge was on zero atmospheres.) Three of the firemen left the basement hearing their Station Officer say “leave the door open I‘m just, going to take a look”. Within minutes of the exiting men leaving the basement the alarm was raised. However, but due to the complex nature of the basernent it was almost an hour before the bodies of Station Officer Fourt-Wells and Firefighter Stocking were located and brought out.

John Bishop was interviewed about the fire by Channel 4 Television some years ago. In it he related the early stages of the Smithfield fire;

“When the first pumps arrived, thick acrid smoke was pouring out of the market's maze of underground tunnels leading to cold storage rooms.” 

With the arrival of senior officers from the B Divisional headquarters at Clerkenwell Fourt-Wells although in command, he and his crew members were in the basement. John Bishop recalls the moment;

“Clerkenwell’s Station Officer and a fireman had headed down into the dense smoke, never to be seen alive again”. 

Station Officer Fort-Wells and ET fireman Dick Stocking had entered the fire wearing their Mark IV proto oxygen breathing apparatus sets, sets that they pre-war counterparts had worn in the 1920s. In those early stages, with six BA carrying pumps and two emergency tenders in attendance increasing numbers of firemen, wearing breathing apparatus, were committed into the basement. John Bishop and his pump’s crew would be one of scores of teams to enter the Smithfield basement. Again he relates his story;

“It was a maze and we used clapping signals. I was going down the centre and I'd send men down a passageway here and there. You would walk along one step at a time, with the back of your hand in front of you in case you walked into something red-hot, making sure you were not going to fall down a hole. All we could find was passageways with meat packed either side from floor to ceiling. The smoke got thicker - you could eat it; black oily smoke. It was very cold down there and you were cold, even though you were sweating. That was fear.”

John Bishop would be reunited with his former Clerkenwell workmate, Dick Stocking, for the very last time, for it was he that led his Whitefriars crew in search of the two missing men. There was intense activity as the frantic search got underway. But possibly other lives may have been saved by the coolness of Assistant Divisional Officer Lloyd (the first senior officer to arrive) who checked the oxygen cylinder contents of each rescuer as they entered into the basement. Even so many still put their own lives at risk by having less than half of their full cylinder content. It was a crew from Manchester Square that located Fourt-Wells under packages and carcasses of meat not far from their entry point. His mouthpiece was on the floor and he was lifeless. They started to return his body to the surface but were relieved of their gruelling, unenviable, task by other firemen. Bishop found Stocking against a blank wall in a dead-end passageway. He showed no signs of life. On his return to the exit Bishop had to hand the task of recovery to other firemen as his own oxygen supply had expired, but he made it back out. 

For the next 24 hours crews struggled to come to terms with the blaze. The cold January air turned to excessive heat as crew after crew combated the dense smoke and worsening conditions. Such were the arduous, physically punishing, conditions that BA crews could not work for more than 10-15 minutes at a time. 

Despite the determination of the firemen the complexity of the 
basement, the manner of its flammable insulation and stored meat products the intensity of the fire was able spread through much of two and a half acre maze of underground passages aided by air-ducts and ceiling voids. The dominance of the fire below ground forced superheated gases and smoke up into the street, heat which firemen had to struggle against even when bringing jets to bear though some of the pavement openings and external trapdoors.

Smithfield was a blaze which had robbed the London Fire Brigade of two of its own. It was a Clerkenwell fireman, who knew Fort-Wells that described him as “One of the old `smoke eaters’ who would not give up hunting for the seat of a fire…”

A Smithfield worker.

George Goodwin was an apprentice butcher working at Smithfield. He worked at a small family butchers at 59 Long Lane. It was situated at the top end of the market and as he arrived for work in the early hours of that Thursday morning already there was a lot of police activity and plenty of fire engines at the Poultry Hall. Smoke was rising from the vents in the walkway outside the market. Long Lane was closed off and the meat carrying lorries were cleared from their positions backed onto the entrances to the market to a place of safety.

As he watched the situation changed and more and more fire engines arrived. The smoke got thicker and blacker and hung over the market like a cloud. Not recalling exactly when but rumours started to surface that there were a number of firemen hurt, possibly some killed. The meat workers we were kept away from the activities taking place but he wrote how he was “relieved I was not a fireman.” Crowds of market men, in their long blue or white bloodied smocks, stood watching as the firemen battled with the fire after the tragedy unfolded.

Timeframe of the Smithfield fire.

0218 Call to the Union Cold Store-Smithfield Street.

B20 (Clerkenwell) PE. P. ET

B36 (Whitefriars) P

B35 (Cannon Street) TL

0230. From Station Officer Fourt-Wells. Make pump four.

B36 (Whitefriars) PE and B33 (Redcross Street) P plus A4 (Euston) AFS Pump ordered. ADO Lloyd and DO Shawyer attending from B Div HQ (Clerkenwell)

O246. From DO Shawyer. Considerable amount of smoke issuing from basement store, market section. No fire yet. BA men searching.

0253. From DO Shawyer. Second ET required to stand-by.    D61 (Lambeth) ET ordered.

0255. From DO Shawyer. A building of 2 floors and basement, about 300 ft x 300 ft, part of basement alight.

0307. Ex Tele call to Lambeth Control. Fire Charterhouse Street. (DO Shawyer informed.)

0315. From DO Shawyer. Making an entrance at Charterhouse Street. 

0318. From DO Shawyer. Making entry from two different sides of the fire. Smithfield Street and Charterhouse Street. The fire has not yet been located. 4 additional pumps with BA required to stand-by. A4 (Euston) P from Clerkenwell. B32 (Bishopsgate) P from Whitefriars. B27 (Shoreditch) P and D62 (Southwark) P.

0325. From DO Shawyer. Fire located on Charterhouse Street side of incident.

0342. From ACO Cunningham at Smithfield Street make pumps 8.

A1 (Manchester Square) P from Clerkenwell. D64 (Old Kent Road) P from Whitefriars. B33 (Redcross Street) PE. B35 (Cannon Street) PE.  Brig HQ (Lambeth) CU. A1 (Manchester Square) HLL.

0347. From ACO Cunningham. 3 emergency lights required. Extent of fire still not known, access being made from all available points.

Deputy Chief Leete mobile to incident.

0356. CU arrived and in control. (R/T 20)

0408. From ACO Cunningham. Make pumps 12.

B37 (Holloway) P from Redcross Street. A10 (Kensington) from Clerkenwell. B29 (Burdett Road) from Whitefriars. D66 (Brixton) P from Cannon Street.

(*On the make pumps 12; 4 PEs, 13 Ps plus 1 AFS pump would be in attendance.)

0433. From Chief Officer. Order CaV at once with refreshments for 100 men. (D61 Lambeth CaV ordered.)

0448. From Chief Officer. Second ambulance required at Smithfield Market.

0459. From Chief Officer. 10 BA pumps required as relief at 0600hrs.

(B21 Islington, B24 Homerton, B26 Bethnal Green, B31 Shadwell, C42 Deptford, C43 East Greenwich, C50 Lewisham, D63 Dockhead, D60 Clapham, A3 Camden Town.)

0500. From Chief Officer. Make ambulances 4.

0507. From the Chief Officer. Fm Stropp removed to hospital.

0514. From the Chief Officer Station Officer Fourt–Wells and Fireman Stocking (B20) overcome by smoke and removed to hospital by ambulance. (They were pronounced dead upon arrival.)

Friday 24^th

1645. Stop message sent.

The Chief’s tactics at Smithfield.

The Brigade of the late 1950s comprised of only three principal officers; the Chief Officer and his two Assistant Chief Officers (one nominated his deputy). All three remained in constant attendance in excess of 24 hours before either the deputy (Mr Leete) or the ACO (Mr Cunningham) was order to take charge of a major fire in Bermondsey.

Chief Officer Frederick Delve was no stranger to major fires. However, the Smithfield fire would prove to be a ‘watershed’ for the Brigade’s breathing apparatus procedures (procedures that had ramifications for the UK fire service as a whole). For Delve and his men at Smithfield it would be one of the most difficult breathing apparatus incidents faced in recent peacetime history. Nor was Delve a stranger to men dying on his ‘watch. Nine firemen and officers had died in the line of duty since the end of the World War II.

When the Chief Officer arrived at Smithfield he was greeted by his crews facing thickening smoke and arduous conditions. Crews were working underground, in breathing apparatus, in relays to seek out the fire and attacked it wherever possible. Two emergency crews, also in breathing apparatus, where situated at both entry points ready to be committed to seek out colleagues in difficulty or find those overdue. Additionally a further emergency crew stood by at the Brigade’s Control Unit ready to replace the other emergency teams should they be required to enter the basement. The crews at Smithfield were relived at about four hour intervals plus at the change of watch at 0900 and 1800 hrs on the 23^rd. Delve also discovered that his officer’s attempts to get a feel of the layout of the basement were seriously hampered due to the lack of employee knowledge about its layout and locked doors.

Delve consolidated the work of Shawyer and Cunningham. Yet despite all their attempts to direct the extinguishment of the flames, and the tenacity of Delve’s firemen undertaking the task, a task which had them working in the most challenging of conditions, the fire was gaining a firm hold. It was spreading through the basement. Such were the conditions during the morning of the 23rd that crews had to be withdrawn from the Charterhouse Street entrance with all efforts concentrated on the West Smithfield tunnel entrance. With day shift (Blue Watch crews) now fully engaged attempts were made to create fire breaks in the flammable insulation by teams of firemen. Large areas were painstakingly cut away from the basement walls and ceiling. All to no avail, the fire continued on its path of destruction.

Flooding the basement was attempted and water was applied from every possible vantage point. The Chief later reported that 500,000 gallons an hour was being pumped into the basement. (Individual pump capacity in 1958 was in the range of 500-750 gpm.) However, the drains disposed of the water before it could make any significant impact on the fire. Later the flooding was abandoned as large quantities of water was penetrating nearby underground railway tunnels.

Still with no noticeable effect from the previous firefighting efforts by the late afternoon of the 23^rd the Chief chose to push the fire back from the Charterhouse Street side towards the lift shaft in West Smithfield from where, it was hoped, the fire would vent itself. The attack was made by fresh crews who inched their way into the basement. By this point the heat was so great that crews had to be relieved every 10-15 minutes, even so many were overcome by the heat. They had to be assisted, or carried, towards the entry point by colleagues, themselves affected by the heat, and from where the semi-collapsed firemen were hauled up the lift shaft by line before being removed to St Bart’s hospital by ambulance. Yet despite the attrition rate of his firemen Delve pushed on with these tactics to advance the attack on the fire. But as the heat and conditions below ground grew ever more severe the attackers were forced back. Finally Delve withdrew his men before they were overwhelmed entirely.

As night fell, and the Red Watch firemen returned to the scene, it was hoped that the thickness of the ground floor, at almost 3 feet, would contain the fire. It proved not to be the case. Late on Thursday evening the first breach in the ground floor became evident. Jets positioned to contain the spread proved ineffectual. In the early hours of Friday morning parts of the ground floor collapsed allowing for a massive escape of superheated gases and flame to spread upwards. Crews working inside the Market building were withdrawn. The intensity of the fire was such that the cast-iron columns lost their structural integrity raising fears of the collapse of the roof, which later transpired.

Delve, in anticipation of such developments had previously ordered radial branches to the scene. It remains highly probable that at this point in excess of 20 pumps were actively engaged in containing the fire to the Poultry Market despite pumps not being increased beyond 12!

As the fire let forth its full ferocity it rabidly consumed all before it. It was fuelled by the insulated match boarding wood, wool, bituminous tar which had become deeply contaminated and impregnated with animal fats through the years of lack of service and maintenance. The physics of the now rapid fire spread was aided by the fact that the ground floor had a smaller footprint than that of the basement below it. Therefore it acted as a chimney allowing the furnace like temperatures to overwhelm the firemen’s attempts to contain it. Delve was again forced to withdraw his crews and they had to surround the blaze. There was no saving the Poultry Market. In the darkness of that January morning the ornate corner distinctive towers collapsed in spectacular fashion, the falling balls of flame adding to the pyre below.

At its height the 13 jets and 12 radial branches, fed by 10 pumps and supplied by 18 street hydrants, were throwing 16,000 gallons of water per minute onto the blaze. It was left to the day watch to see the blaze subdued, not least because it had consumed all the available fuel. It was late afternoon that the STOP message was finally sent. Then the more mundane activity of damping down and eliminating hot spots started. The Brigade would remain at the scene in ever decreasing numbers until the 7^th February.  It was during ‘damping down’ that Fireman Handey (Bishopsgate) suffered serious injuries when he fell through the floor into the basement.

The control room staff at the Lambeth headquarters had not only handled the challenging Smithfield fire in the period 23^rd -25^th January but also mobilised the Brigade to a further 259 separate incidents. In addition the Brigade dealt with 7 four pump fires, 1 six pump fire, plus an eight pump fire on the 24^th in an office block in Southwark Street. This was followed by a fifteen pump at a Jam factory in Rouel Road, Bermondsey and a further twenty pump fire in the early hours of the 25^th in a rubber dump/derelict warehouse, Poplar  High Street, East London. Here both the West Ham and Essex fire brigades had to come to the aid of their London colleagues. 

The aftermath. 

The City of London Inquest was open and adjourned on the 24 January. The Coroner, Mr J, Milner-Holme. MA. approving the funerals of Jack Fourt-Wells and Richard Stocking.

The funeral procession of the two Clerkenwell men took place on the 30^th January. Station Officer Jack Fourt-Wells and Fireman Richard Stocking were each carried on a wreath laden turntable ladder. Leaving Clerkenwell fire station with its honour guard the fire engines bearing the men’s’ flagged draped coffins led the cortège through the Smithfield Meat Market before moving on the South London Crematorium at Streatham passing the Brigade Headquarters with it honour guard en-route. The men’s funeral service was conducted by the Rev. D.F.Strudwick, himself a serving London AFS fireman.

Rose Heilbron. QC.

The full inquest of the two men took place on the 28^th February and lasted two and half days. Mrs Fourt-Wells’s interests being represented by Andrew Phelen QC on behalf of the Fire Officer Association. Mrs Stocking by Rose Heibron QC on behalf of the Fire Brigade Union and Mr Davis QC representing the London County Council.Rose Heilbron QC. was a legal pioneer in post war Britain. She practised mainly in personal injury and criminal law and was the second woman to be appointed a High Court judge. But in February 1958, at the request of the Fire Brigade Union solicitors, she looked after the interests of the Stocking family. Both Fourt-Wells and Stocking where found to have died from asphyxia due to the inhalation of fire fumes (carbon monoxide poisoning) when trapped in the unventilated maze of underground chambers below Smithfield. Issues arose as to whether the men had proper supervision. Rose Heilbron placed both Brigade’s officers, including Delve, and the world renowned pathologist, Dr Keith Simpson, under detailed technical questioning. She left no stone unturned.

The jury returned verdicts of ‘misadventure’ on the two deaths. The Coroner recommended the adoption of an automatic warning device designed to be fitted to the breathing apparatus set which would sound when the oxygen was running low. The Coroner did not wish to look into the origin of fire and the cause of the blaze was never ascertained. In his recommendations he also requested the installations of a ‘dry’ sprinkler system installation in similar locations. Finally he also required that a low cylinder warning device should be attached to BA sets and further recommended that the LFB do so in a timescale of 2-3 weeks. 

Breathing apparatus procedures.

Following Smithfield reports were submitted the Fire Brigade Committee of the London County Council by Delve. Once again lessons were to be learned. Some of the problems which occurred at Smithfield regarding BA procedures had occurred at two previous fires at Covent Garden. Although a local (LFB) procedure was set up by 1956 following the second fatal Covent Garden Fire. This involved the provision of a BA Control Point. At Smithfield it was in Charterhouse Lane to record the entry of men wearing BA into the incident. The Control Point consisted of no more than blackboard and chalk. It recorded: Name, Station/location, Time of entry and Time due out.

At Smithfield this procedure proved invaluable. It indicated, later, in the incident that two men were missing and overdue. However, following the tragic loss of life at Smithfield there were concerted calls for a more comprehensive schedule of BA procedures to be formulated. These calls came from Delve, Leete, his Deputy, and Mr John Horner, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union.

Later that same year Fire Service Circular (FSC) 37/1958 was issued. It detailed the findings of the Committee of Inquiry and recommended the following:- Tallies for BA sets; A Stage I and Stage II control procedure for recording & supervising BA wearers: The duties of a control operator: The procedure to be followed by crews: A main control procedure.

In the accompanying letter to the circular Brigades were requested to report their observations and recommendations in light of experience by the end of November 1959. There was at the time no specifications for the design and use of guide or personnel lines. It was considered that more experience had to be gained! Recommendations were, however, made in respect of a specification for a low cylinder pressure warning device and a distress signal device.

Finally, and in light of the views of Fire Brigades following Smithfield and based on their own experiences, it was clear that the use of BA would require more men to be better trained in its use and the safety procedures. Subsequent guidance on the selection of BA wearers was provided in FSC 32/1960 after agreement at the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council on 27 July 1960. It recommended:-18 months operational service before BA training. A possible age limit for wearers. Standards of fitness. Two BA wearers per appliance equipped with BA.

Finally.

A special word of thanks to Dave Goldsmith for sharing some of his extensive archive material in the completion of this narrative. Other information has been taken directly from to documents held at the Metropolitan Archives FB/GEN/2/124 Fire at Poultry Market, Central Markets Smithfield E.C.1 - 23/1/58".

The incident remains listed as a 12 pump fire! However the early attendance on the 23^rd lists 18 pumping appliance (inc 1 AFS pump) plus specials. It was possibly a cultural thing back then, requesting additional appliances rather than making up? It was common pactice in the 1950s and 60s for senior/principal officers to request additional pumps to stand-by at the Control Unit then use them especially in protracted BA operations. 10-12 pumps fire with twice as many machines in attendance  was not without precedent in the LFB. 

It also appears the Smithfield records are incomplete. Sight of the original fire report for Smithfield would clarify some discrepancies. The LCC/LFB classifies the incident as a 20 pump make-up, which given the statement of Delve to the Coroner and the LCC’s Fire Brigade Committee supports this view. His own figures provides for an average attendance of 20 pumps at 3-4 hourly intervals over the 23^rd to the 24^th. The 13 jets and 12 radial branches used required the attendance of more than ‘12 pumps to deliver the amount of water required. Lastly, it was stated, anecdotally, that at one point that smoke from the Smithfield fire travelled through the catacombs into the basement of St Bart’s and the hospital authorities even considered evacuation. However, this was not mentioned in any LFB reports.

There were errors made at Smithfield, but they have to be set in the context of excepted practices of the time. As tragic as the deaths were the sacrifice was not in vain. Lessons were learnt. They helped developed better BA procedures. It remains both unfortunate and regrettable that it took their deaths to bring about such change.