On the last day of the Greater
London Councils’ existence the London Fire Brigade dealt with, if not its
biggest blaze of the year, then one of the capital’s most significant heritage fires.
It was a fire that had tragic and fatal consequences. So an insight into this particular blaze
and its chronology. Plus, with the clarity of hindsight, some observations on
what was an all too familiar problem back in the day of ‘drip fed’ make-up attendances.
What became clear from the
subsequent Royal Inquest; the Government’s own inquiry; and the painstaking
forensic examination, was that this fire had started some considerable time
before the first call to the fire brigade was made. It was concluded that the
blaze started in the early hours of the 31st March. The most
probable cause was spread from a naked flame (a candle) on the upper floor of
the Palace.
Hampton Court Palace remains a Royal
Palace. It’s located in the London Borough of Richmond upon Thames in South-West
London. It has not been lived in by the Royal Family since the 1700s. The
palace contains many notable and rare works of art and furnishings from the
Royal Collection, mainly dating from the two periods of the palace’s construction;
Tudor (Renaissance) and late Stuart to early Georgian. Throughout the twentieth
century Hampton Court established itself as a major London tourist attraction.
Contained within its buildings were fifty “grace and favour” residences that
were given over to esteemed servants and subjects of the Crown. It was the
elderly occupant of one of these grace and favour apartments, Lady Daphne Gale,
the 86-year-old widow of General Sir Richard Gale, whose nightly habit of
always taking a lit candle into her bedroom had set in train a sequence of
events that would be both disastrous for her and the Palace.
The
first call to the London Fire Brigade’s Croydon control room was made at
5.43 a.m. Four fire engines from Twickenham and Kingston, a turntable ladder from
Heston and Sutton’s damage control tender and hose laying lorry turned out from
their respective stations in response to the 999 call from Hampton Court
Palace. Croydon’s fire control unit was also sent as part of the initial
augmented attendance to this high profile special risk.
Directed
by Palace staff, the crews from Twickenham and Kingston made their way
to the affected apartments to assess the extent of the blaze. Crews in breathing
apparatus (BA) undertook an exploratory search to determine the possible extent
of the fire whilst others secured the initial water supplies and laid out hose
lines. Despite there being four pumping appliances already in attendance,
thirteen minutes after receiving the first call, the officer in charge sent a
priority message, “Make pumps four”. This was followed five minutes later by an
informative message which indicated that the whole of the gallery ceiling was
alight and that it was not possible to ascertain the full extent of the fire!
Both
Twickenham’s and Kingston fire station grounds’ cover large areas of South-West
London. This means that fire engines from surrounding stations have
considerable distances to travel just to reach Hampton Court Palace, adding vital
minutes before they arrive at the scene. It was during those precious early minutes
the intensity of the fire grew. It heated surrounding combustible materials,
allowing ignition temperatures to reach critical levels thus enabling the uncontrolled
spread of fire. A fire that rapidly increase in area and spread with astonishing
speed. The fire had established a firm hold and having consumed the old ladies
apartment it sought fresh fuel.
Seven
minutes after making pumps four, pumps were made six. The list of urgent
tasks that the officer in charge had to prioritise was daunting. Three
residents were still believed to be involved and unaccounted for. A rapidly worsening
fire situation was stretching his crews and reinforcing crews had to be briefed.
He had to juggle the demands of search and rescue and firefighting. Additionally there were considerable pressures placed upon him to
initiate vital salvage operations. (The London Salvage Corps having long since
ceased to exist.)
Despite
the requirements of the then 1947 Fire Services Act, (which placed a duty on every
fire authority “to ensure efficient arrangements for ensuring reasonable steps
are taken to prevent or mitigate damage to property resulting from fire fighting”)
the London Fire Brigade had not given sufficient emphasis to 'salvage'
training following the demise of the London Salvage Corps. Training that should have
replicated the standards of the former Salvage Corps. Salvage work had remained
an afterthought for many and that lack of pre-planning came home to bite you at
incidents such as this. This deficiency now came into clear focus as national
treasures were at risk, not only from the fire and smoke but from water damage
too.
Fortunately
such pre-planning was something the Palace staff had taken account of given the
possibility of a serious fire or flood. Their staff, including its salvage
squad, had been actively engaged in the work of removing and protecting the
many historic paintings and artefacts. Working in sometimes difficult conditions,
and with the aid of some Brigade personnel, the salvage plan was put into
action. Almost all the invaluable works of art and irreplaceable treasures were
subsequently saved for the nation. The same cannot be said for the actual
fabric of the building. Finally amid all this frantic activity Palace’s
automatic fire detection system finally operated. (6.15 a.m.)
The arrival of increasing numbers
of senior fire officers resulted in further evaluations of the
situation and a change of command as more and more pumps were requested. Pumps were
made ‘eight’ forty-four minutes after the initial call and the ‘Make pumps
twelve’ twelve minutes after that. By now the fire had engulfed the whole of
the State apartments, an area some forty metres by twenty metres in a building
described as, ‘three-storeys’ high. With ‘make pumps twelve’ another senior officer
of higher rank took on the mantle of ‘incident commander’. He attempted to put his
plan of action into play. This was easier said than done, given the complexity
of the Palace and the lack of access for the firefighting crews. Also, the fire-ground
description of the wing as three floors was misleading. The upper two floors,
which were erupting into fierce flame, created a false impression as the high
vaulted ceiling of both the ground and first floors made the building at least
the equivalent of five-storey building.
An additional damage control tender
had been requested to support the salvage work being undertaken
under the direction of the Palace’s conservators. Now with the
intensity of the fire burning its way through the pitched roof, that was itself
surrounded by an ornate stone balustrade, the one hundred foot turntable ladders
were increased to three.
Many of the crews wearing compressed
air breathing apparatus sets struggled, in their heavy equipment, to gain a
better foothold from which to assault the blaze from within. They were severely
hampered, not only by heavy smoke logging, but by the very nature of this
historic building. Security was naturally very important, given the treasures
the Palace contained. Getting through secured doors and entrances was difficult
and sometimes impossible. With every minute’s delay the fire grew stronger and
gained a firmer hold.
That was not all that was hampering
the Brigade’s efforts with a fire that was clearly gaining the upper hand.
Water supplies within the Palace’s ground were insufficient to meet the needs
of the major pumps that were now supplying many thousands of litres of water
per minute to the various jets that were being directed onto the blaze. Some
with greater success than others. A water relay was established from outside
the Palace perimeter. The Water Board’s ‘turncock arrived and ensured that all
available water were diverted to provide the Brigades needs and ensured there
was no loss of the pressure to the hydrant fed supplies. All the while the fire
within the grace and favour apartments continued its insatiable search for fuel.
Having moved upwards and outwards it was now affecting the very structure as it
ate away at the timber rafters and joists that supported the roof and upper
floors. The heat of the blaze rose in to the hundreds of degrees centigrade
(over 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit.)
The lead early morning news story on
the BBC and ITN that day was the dramatic blaze at Hampton Court Palace. The
clamour of the media to cover this 'breaking news' story was one more
pressure to add to the growing list of tactical considerations of the
Incident Commander. The primary consideration for any London Fire Brigade officer
has always focused on the preservation of life and property. Despite the many
additional duties falling to the Brigade to perform rescues and firefighting
were still the major component. It remains the one area where the public always
expects the London Fire Brigade to excel. The command of fire-ground incidents
including search and rescue can vary, depending on the scale and complexity of
the particular fire being fought. There is, however, one constant in the
deployment of the crews that weighs heavily in the mind of any Incident
Commander. That is the interface and interaction with the structure, its
occupancy, its inherent features, hazards and characteristics in a fire. In
plain English the risk over benefits of putting firefighters in harm’s way.
 |
| Assistant Chief Officer Roy Snarey. |
Assistant Chief Officer Roy Snarey
had taken charge. ‘Losing’ the Palace was not on his agenda and certainly not 'live' on national television. This brash Nottinghamshire man had been in the
Brigade all his considerable service but he had lost none of his Nottingham
accent. Highly intelligent, this principal officer had set about co-ordinating
his team of senior officers as soon as he had taken command. He hit the ground running and was determined
to contain the blaze and not allow the fire to spread outside the existing fire
zone. By 8.30 a.m. he had his BA firefighters
and other firefighting crews in position. His water relay was working and his radio
message sent from the major Fire Control Unit simply said; “Steady progress
being made.”
The partial collapse of the central
section of the roof eased the smoke logging somewhat and, after
adjusting the position of the firefighting crews, he made pumps twenty. He was now in a
position to both contain (by boundary cooling) and press home his attack
and extinguish the blaze. In doing so he was conscious of the risks that had to
be taken by the firefighters who were within the blazing building. For them
there was the ever-present danger of working in a burning structure, regardless
of its particular construction. Both the firefighters themselves and the
Incident Commander had to constantly evaluate the potential risks over benefits
before committing themselves to action that may provide no meaningful gain. It
was always an unwritten tenant of ‘London firemen’, especially the former smoke-eaters
and their “old school” senior officers, that the only way to fight a fire was
from the inside. But the risks have always to be measured and assessed in a controlled
and calculated manner. No building, or property alone is worth the life of a firefighter.
But many firefighters have lost their lives in the past at fires. It is, sadly,
the nature of their job.
Firefighting, by its very nature,
involves risk. The level of risk is clearly different where life is involved as
opposed to saving property alone. In this case Roy Snarey’s view was clear, the
remainder of the Palace would be saved. With the firefighters already in
attendance and with the aid of the reinforcing crews soon to arrive, he would
have the fire managed, despite the fact that many had been battling the blaze
for over three hours and were re-entering the fray for a second or third time,
having changed their BA cylinders once, some twice, after working to their
maximum duration.
Only one person remained
unaccounted for. A substantial collapse of the State apartments’ upper floors
occurred as the fifteen pumps, three turntable ladders and two damage control
tenders arrived to relieve the night watch crews. The collapse hampered
progress, as the charred timbers and fallen brickwork and masonry blocked
access routes and made the continuing search both difficult and dangerous. By
10.45 a.m. the crews had penetrated deep into the search area and the removal
of the heavy debris was being undertaken by teams working in relays. The
charred remains of Lady Daphne Gale were located late in the morning amongst
the debris of her former apartment. A part of the Palace that was now unrecognisable.
She was carefully removed and taken by ambulance to the local mortuary.
Both the Queen and Prince Charles,
who was nursing an injured arm from a prior accident, visited the scene
of the fire and were escorted inside the building by a principal officer whilst the
crews continued their work. The Queen was clearly distressed and anxious about
the extent of the damage to one of her Royal Palaces. She was joined in this
tour of inspection by the then Home Secretary Kenneth Baker (who had
Ministerial responsibility for the fire service nationally). In his subsequent news
interview, Baker praised both the efforts of the Brigade and the Palace’s staff
for their gallant and heroic efforts to save both the Palace and many of the
national treasures. He was able to confirm that, in fact, only two paintings had
been destroyed. However, the State apartments, the King’s Audience chamber and
the Cartoon Gallery were not so fortunate. Half the first floor and
three-quarters of the second floor and the roof were destroyed by the fire.
Much of the debris was being carefully removed by the fire brigade crews.
Special attention was paid to salvaging the timber joists and beams, so that
subsequent re-construction could be based on, and benefit from the
craftsmanship of the earlier skilled workers who had built the Palace two
centuries before.
 | |
| Fire investigators search the debris. |
In the weeks and months that
followed, first up was the Royal Inquest, required for “All bodies found lying
within the limits of the Monarch’s Palaces.” This recorded Lady Gale’s death as
accidental. A direct consequence of the lit candle that she was in the habit of
taking into her bedroom. The Government Inquiry conducted by Sir John Garlick
had been ordered by the Secretary of State for the Department of the
Environment, Nicholas Ridley. Sir John’s findings were presented to Parliament
on the 3rd July by the Secretary of State. Amongst Sir John’s
conclusions was his contention that it was highly unlikely that an earlier
discovery of the fire would have averted the death of Lady Gale. The Palace’s
fire detection system had inadvertently been rendered inoperative. He
criticised the arrangement that allowed the fire alarm system, with design
shortcomings, to be installed and then handed over with a less than adequate
commissioning process. Sir John had discovered that there had been a “turf-war”
as regards the jurisdiction of Hampton Court between the Department of the
Environment and the Royal Household. This had contributed to an unsatisfactory
state of affairs as to the responsibility and accountability for the Palace. He
made recommendations for improving the automatic fire alarm system as well as changes
in the procedures for its use and in the training of the staff concerned.
In his statement to the House, Mr
Ridley made special note of Sir John’s praise
towards the devotion and courage of
the Palace staff and its salvage squad in
seeking to protect life and
property once the fire had been discovered. Whatever
the Brigade’s own contribution to
the salvaging of the Nation’s treasures from
the Palace were, the Members of the
House never got to hear about it. It was
never mentioned!
