The Second Great Fire of Tooley Street. Wilson's Wharf-'Make pumps 50'

The 9^th August 1971 was a Monday, a day that would go down in London Fire Brigade history.

The Broad Street Goods Depot fire, was for the outgoing LCC/LFB one, if not the, most notable and largest post-war fires. Even the start of the newly formed GLC/LFB got off to a blazing start with a 30 pumper and the massive timber yard fire. The 30 was at Grocers Hall in the City of London in September 1965, and then the Bamberger’s timber yard conflagration in Tottenham, north London, the following year (a 50 pump fire). Yet arguably the London Fire Brigade's most difficult peacetime fire happened in the very same part of Bermondsey which had brought London’s fire brigade into existence. Tooley Street, SE1 was once again the scene of an inferno that tested London’s firemen to the full.

The fire started in an unoccupied refrigerated warehouse at “Wilson’s Wharf”, Battle Bridge Lane, Tooley Street SE1 on the 9^th August 1971. The brigade was in continuous attendance for three days. This fire tested resources of the Brigade to its utmost. It proved to be one of the biggest, in terms of manpower, since the Second World War and was certainly one of the most difficult to combat. Some 300 operational personnel (excluding reliefs), very many senior officers and all the Brigade HQ’s principal officers attended the fire at some stage. Nearly 100 stations were involved, either directly or indirectly and all types of ancillary vehicles were used. Even Instructors and breathing apparatus training staff, from the nearby Southwark Training Centre, attended, in the latter stages two squads of recruits were employed to help make-up hose and collect other equipment.

For those unfamiliar with those times or the area by 1971 much of London’s, and certainly Southwark and Bermondsey’s, riverside warehouses and its dockside property was falling victim to vandalism and decay. The Tooley Street area was no exception. There were plans to redevelop the area by the London Dockland Development Corporation but this would take years to come to fruition. Work had started in the late 1960s to demolish many properties. Due to the solid construction of these Victorian buildings, some unscrupulous demolition contractors found that it was easier if they were accidentally burnt out first!  The local Dockhead and Southwark fire station crews were no strangers to empty or derelict warehouse fires.

 

The first alarm to the fire at Wilson’s Wharf was received at Lambeth’s Brigade Headquarters Control (M2FH). It was logged at 1448hrs, a fire at Tooley Street, Battle Bridge Lane, on Dockhead fire station’s ground. For the White Watch day shift that afternoon routines had been underway for nearly an hour; some stations performing drills, others considerably extending their lunchtime game of volleyball. At some stations the pump was unavailable for calls, either engaged in outside duties or ‘off the run’ waiting for a mechanical defect to be repaired at Lambeth workshops. So when the bells went down at Dockhead, Southwark and Cannon Street only the pump-escapes were available. A turntable ladder from Barbican was also dispatched to make the augment attendance. Two minutes later a second call was received at the Lambeth control room and an additional pump was sent from Whitechapel and the fireboat ‘Firebrace’ from Lambeth river station were ordered on.

Dockhead’s PE was on the scene in two minutes. On arrival the Sub Officer in charge was met by the workman who had been using the oxyacetylene cutting set on the third floor of the warehouse complex. The Sub Officer ordered his crew to set into the nearest hydrant, supply a branch and effect an entry into the building by an external staircase situated at the warehouse’s western end. Southwark’s crew was ordered to don Proto breathing apparatus and the first assistance message ‘Make pumps four, BA required’ was sent at 1453hrs. At this time dense smoke was issuing from various openings at third-floor level but no flame was visible. Having dispatched the assistance message, the Sub Officer then went with the workman to search for alternative means of access to the building.

Station Officer Bill Williams, who was in charge of Cannon Street’s pump escape, found on arrival great difficulty was being experienced in getting into the building and the density of smoke was rapidly increasing. He made pumps eight at 1502hrs.

The affected warehouse complex was located in the typically narrow streets that had provided access in south London’s original Victorian commercial dockside area. The property involved comprised of an irregular-shaped array of brick built buildings, six floors high and a basement. The site covered approximately 200 feet by 300 feet in area. It housed seven unoccupied refrigerated warehouses interconnected at each floor level. A disused refrigeration engine room was at the first-floor level of one warehouse, its machinery and plant having been removed previously. The complex was linked by enclosed bridges on the east side at second, third, fourth and fifth floor levels to warehouse and open bridges on the North side at second, third, fourth and fifth floor levels to some warehouses buildings. All of the windows forming part of the cold store, together with the loopholes above the ground floor except those leading to the communicating bridges, which were protected by double iron doors, had been bricked up and internally insulated, resulting in an impenetrable ‘windowless fortress’.  
 

The complex, except for that part of the ground floor of one warehouse occupied by the tea merchants, had been vacant for about 18 months. The common basement extended throughout the whole complex of the warehouses. Concrete floors were at basement and ground floor level and timber floors above that. The upper floors were supported by rolled steel joists on unprotected cast-iron columns. With the exception of that part occupied by the tea merchants and the engine room the building was insulated with four inches of Onozote (a highly flammable expanded rubber covering) secured in place by two inch wooden battens, which were protected by a layer of one inch close fitting tongued-and grooved timber. The upper floors of one warehouse were used as a deep freeze. Here Onozote insulation was at least six inches thick. All of the piping forming part of the refrigeration plant was also lagged with Onozote.

On that Monday a contractor and one of his workmen had been attempting to remove a disused air cooler on the third floor of the affected warehouse. The work entailed the removal of the Onozote lagging from the attached piping and necessitated the cutting of the flange bolts on the piping. This was carried out using oxyacetylene cutting equipment. Around 2.15 p.m. flame was seen shooting up from the adjacent wall at floor level. It was thought that a spark from the cutting operations had ignited the tape covering the Onozote insulation on the piping. An attempt was made to extinguish the fire with a fire extinguisher but conditions quickly became untenable. Whilst the workmen vacated the building and raised the alarm, and despite the severity of the fire, the contractor went back into the warehouse with two more extinguishers. He quickly realised that the situation was way beyond his control and his attempt to extinguish the fire was abandoned. He did however, at considerable risk, have the presence of mind to remove the cutting equipment to a position more remote from the fire.

The duty ‘B’ Division Assistant Divisional Officer responded to the incident on the first assistance message. He arrived as pumps were made eight and took charge. He ordered an additional branch with a Proto BA crew to try to force an entry at the third-floor level of the building on the eastern side via the covered bridge leading from an adjacent block. Dense smoke was now seen issuing from all openings at third-floor level and travelling to all parts of the complex. There were still no visible signs of fire but the heat was intense and crews were unable to make any appreciable penetration into the warehouse.

Strenuous further efforts were being made to gain an entry while heavy smoke poured from all the openings on the third floor. None of the crews reported any sign of fire in spite of battling with intense levels of heat. The ADO’s attack plan was now concentrated at third and fourth floor levels via the  interconnecting bridges, using crews protected by water jets from the TL monitor and from reinforcing pumps.

The duty B Division Divisional Officer, DO Samler, took command at about 1520hrs. He requested two additional BA carrying pumps and continued with the existing plan of action, which was to concentrate on forcing entries into the premises at the third and fourth floor levels via the bridges leading from adjacent buildings. Water jets from the TL monitor and from pumps continued to be deployed to protect the crews engaged on these tasks.

With the fire gaining in intensity pumps were successively increased to 15 at 1533hrs; 20 pumps at 1555hrs; and 30 pumps TL’s 3 at 1616hrs. The command of operations was consecutively taken over by the B Divisional Commander; Norman Rose, Deputy Assistant Chief Officer Hoare, Southern Command, then Assistant Chief Officer Don Burrell, Brigade Headquarters. He was followed by the Deputy Chief Officer Harold Chisnell. Despite the most determined efforts of all the crews and the additional resources, no meaningful penetration of the premises had been achieved when the Chief Officer Joe Milner arrived. He assumed command at 1640hrs.

At this stage conditions were becoming extremely serious. The complex layout of the premises, the exceptional thickness of the walls and the inadequacy of access points combined with the massive generation of smoke and heat was severely taxing the stamina of firemen and officers alike. It was proving impossible for non-BA crews to even hold their positions at such meagre access points. The number Proto breathing apparatus being limited to only three Proto sets carried, normally, on the pump. Additional Proto BA sets were carried on the Brigade’s emergency tenders (which had been increased to four). Only a third of the firefighters and officers had BA protection at the height of the blaze.

The tremendous heat build-up and out pouring of thick smoke posed major problems for crews struggling to establish a bridgeheads from which to counter the blaze. Attempts were made to 'break open’ some of the bricked-up windows on the third floor with sledge-hammers and chisels, but little progress was made and this had to be abandoned. Contractors trying to break in using pneumatic drills had to been abandoned when the walls above them started to crack. Meanwhile, the BA crews were slowly being forced back by impenetrable smoke and the extreme heat. As a consequence the Chief decreed the fire ground should be divided into three sectors, North, South-East and South-West. Each sector was to be under the direct command of an Assistant Chief Officer while the Chief and his Deputy shared the task of walking around the sectors to co-ordinate operations. 

Chief Officer Joe Milner.

Just 20 minutes after the Chief’s arrival conditions had deteriorated further still. Smoke was now issuing from virtually all the buildings in the complex. Temperatures inside were rising at a significant rate. It seemed evident that the fire could not be contained to the originating warehouse and would quickly spread to other buildings in the complex. If this occurred there would be a very possibility of fire and radiated heat being transmitted across Battle Bridge Lane, English Ground and Morgan's Lane, affecting the surrounding buildings. If this occurred the Brigade could have faced with a conflagration of Blitz-like proportions: becoming a blaze of such a magnitude it would be ironically reminiscent of that experienced by James Braidwood, London's first fire chief, at the fatal historical fire of 186. A fire which brought about his own demise. In consultation with his principal officers Joe Milner considered that only two courses were open to him;
 

Option One. 
To concentrate on subduing the fire in central warehouse and arresting its development to the adjacent. This would mean committing crews to extremely hazardous and punishing conditions; furthermore it would require a total commitment in the order of Eighty Pumps to achieve. This was due to the limited periods BA crews could be exposed to operate inside the premises. Such a decision would requiring constant regular reliefs and additional resources. It would also denuding large areas of London of any fire cover for a protracted period for what could only be viewed as an attempt to preserve semi-derelict property. (During the course of the Tooley Street fire the brigade dealt with 222 separate calls to other emergencies in the capital.  

Option Two.

To abandon the efforts to subdue the fire in central warehouse and to concentrate on surrounding the fire and confining the spread to the area bounded by Battle Bridge Lane, English Ground and the River Thames. The success of this course depended on allowing the fire to break through the roof of warehouse. With ventilation achieved it would reduce the lateral transmission of heat and smoke. The down side of this course of action being the danger that once the fire broke through, there would be a serious threat to surrounding property and adjacent area from radiated heat and flying firebrands.

Following discussion he chose the ‘ventilation’ option. At 1712hrs the radio officer in Brigade Control took the priority message were pumps were increased to a historical 50. The Officer of the Watch at Lambeth control organised the mobilisation of the next twenty pumps, then went about the task of arranging stand-by appliances to cover empty fire stations. The Brigade’s special cover stations retained their pump-escapes but there were lots of empty fire stations all over London. Restricted mobilising had been in operation since the make pumps 30, but another large fire in the Greater London area could see London fire cover reduced to desperate, possibly dangerous, levels.

The original, and exhausted, crews plus the new arrivals were deployed and concentrated on confining the spread of the fire to an area bounded by Battle Bridge Lane, English Ground and the river and the protection of the surrounding properties. 

At 1755 hours a violent flashover occurred. Three BA firemen, working in a covered bridge leading between two warehouses were injured. One suffered serious burns to his hands and face from the blast and was removed to hospital where he was detained. All other personnel were then rapidly withdrawn.

Fireman Stephen Jacob, from Cannon Street, witnessed this event. He later recalled it was like watching someone using a flame thrower from within the building and projecting it through the open doorway. The ball of flame containing large chunks of red hot debris. Superheated gases and flame belching out from within. He considered the crew involved were very lucky to have survived the blast which was largely due to their quick thinking and experience.

As the drama unfolded at Wilsons Wharf 1800hrs was the time of the shift change. But this was no normal day. Station routines were already cancelled and Brigade Control circulated a message that all stations were to take an early supper in anticipation of multi-pump reliefs.

At Wilson’s Wharf it was evident that several floors in central warehouse had collapsed. Fire was now breaking through the building’s face at ground, first and second floor levels. By 1900hrs large cracks had opened up in the eastern and southern walls of the warehouse, belching flame and smoke thereby enabling crews to make better progress with their assault on the fire in the surrounding sections of the complex.

The complex business of releasing some of the day shift crews, who had been working under extreme pressure in difficult and dangerous condition was got under way by the Brigade’s major control unit crew. It’s Divisional Officer trying to balance getting crews away, get relief crews briefed whilst the fire still raged. Parked fire engines filled Tooley Street. Fresh crews were arriving whilst some were preparing to return weary crews to their stations. Some crews, tired, wet, grimy and smoke stained cradled cups of tea in their hands-grateful for the refreshment from Lambeth’s canteen van. Other, clearly exhausted, sat in the street, some dunking biscuits, whilst many having a well-earned drag on a roll-up or getting out their trusty pipe from an inside tunic pocket. Senior officers, looking equally weary, mixed freely with the firemen all unified in having fought a common foe. But the fight was not over yet.

The premises were being surrounded now by a combination of both White and Blue watch crews. Radial branches and ground monitors were operating from street level and from adjacent roofs and other vantage points. During this time and until 2300hrs, when the eastern wall collapsed, the fire continued to intensify but the ventilation provided by the cracks reduced the sideways spread of smoke and heat. Even after the collapse of the roof and walls of the central warehouse the fire continued to gather intensity and it was necessary to withdraw and redeploy some of the crews and equipment.

Lambeth’s PE and pump had gone on at make pumps 30. They were among some of the appliances released soon after 1800 with instructions to exchange crews and return to the scene of the fire.  Lambeth’s pump crew being one of the first reliefs. Detailed to relieve a day shift crew, there crew of three with Proto BA set carried their shoulders negotiated its way over the multitude of charged hose lines that lay entwined in the narrow access lane. It was a tribute to the accuracy of the hand drawn plan in the control unit that they found the crew working in the general area indicated. As they neared their position, and passing under one of the overhead connecting walkways, they looked up to see two white helmeted figures emerge from the swirling mass of smoke from the warehouse. The Deputy Chief, Harold Chisnall- a former Middlesex fireman who had risen through the ranks and came into London on the formation of the GLC-LFB, exited the building coughing and spluttering, as was the staff office who accompanied him. The Deputy leaned over the metal bridge and was violently sick. Regaining his composure he returned to the warehouse doorway were stooping low re-entered the smoke filled second floor and his Staff Officer bringing up the rear.

The mixed cacophony of sound was punishing the firemen’s. The loud cracking of timber, the crashing of internal walls, and the hum of major pumps working at high pressure all combined with the thud of the jets striking the building. All these sounds reverberating in the confined enclosed spaces we were working in. It seemed to be trying to drown out the frightening sound of the fire, whilst failing, as it rose above the sound of everything else. With the crew relieved, their Proto sets started up, Lambeth’s crew entered the fray.

The continuing development of the fire threatened property fronting on to Battle Bridge Lane, the walls of which were already showing cracks. Battle Bridge Lane was only 20 feet wide at this point and should the fire have jumped this it would spread rapidly throughout this adjoining block of property which contained valuable stocks of combustible goods. Fire crews were therefore redeployed to give the maximum concentration of attack to the buildings on the west side of Battle Bridge Lane and to subdue the fires in interconnected warehouses.

After six hours of non-stop attack the situation seemed to have improved and the 'fire surrounded' message was sent. The day watch had finally been relieved and the Blue Watch crews were re-deployed at this stage to prevent the fire from 'jumping' across the narrow Battle Bridge Lane to adjoining premises.

Steady progress was made throughout the night and by 0600hrs on the 10th August the fire in the main buildings of the complex had been subdued and was confined to the top three floors of an adjacent warehouse at the junction of English Ground and Battle Bridge Lane.

Throughout the next day shift crews continued to attack these fires with jets until about 1100hrs when the Deputy Chief ordered the use of high-expansion foam. This operation proved successful and by 1330hrs the fire had been reduced to the fourth and fifth floors and entry had been effected by BA crews. Although heavy smoke was still being encountered, steady progress was made throughout the day and it was possible to send the ‘STOP’ message at 2038hrs on the second day. Some thirty hours after the fire had started. Fire crews remained on scene until the 11^th August.

The firefighting operations at Wilson’s Wharf involved the use of 20 jets, 3 TL monitors, eight radial branches, and one Turbex High Expansion Foam unit and in excess of 200 one-hour Proto BA sets using an estimated 315 cylinders. The damage to the complex consisted of three-quarters of all floors severely damaged by fire, the remainder severely damaged by fire, heat, smoke and water, one half of the roof severely damaged by fire, heat and smoke.

All stations; all divisions; all commands; LSC.

From the Chief Officer.

Stop for Wilsons wharf, Tooley Street.

A range of unoccupied buildings

Of 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 floors and basement

Covering an area of 200 x 300ft

2/3rds damaged by fire 1/2 of roof off

20 jets 8 radial jets 3 TL monitors high ex foam. BA Too 2038.

National newspaper reports, covering the blaze, said that three hundred firemen had fought the blaze of the century on the banks of the Thames and that three firemen were injured. There was little or no follow up news. The incident was not considered sufficiently news worthy despite the fact that the efforts of containing the conflagration took over 60 hours and it was only the actions of London’s firemen that prevent a blaze of truly catastrophic proportions. But new problems were about to confront the LFB. Two months on and the IRA commenced its terror campaign in London; starting with the BT Tower bombing on October 31^st.